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The frequency and extreme nature of sexual 
violence committed in Iraq, primarily by 
the self-declared Islamic State in Iraq and 
the Levant (ISIL) from 2014 onwards, has 
shocked the international community. Now, 
four years later, victory over ISIL has been 
proclaimed but addressing past atrocities 
and their consequences has barely begun. 
There is a wide discrepancy between Iraq’s 
human rights obligations, stressed by the 
United Nations (UN), and the reality on 
the ground, shaped by the Iraqi authorities. 
The present paper aims to highlight this 
discrepancy by providing an overview of 
the crimes committed, their qualification 
under international law, and the efforts of 
Iraqi authorities to punish those responsible. 
It will also discuss legal frameworks and 
the role of the UN, before positing some 
possible solutions.
Object of the inquiry
The primary object of this inquiry is the 
conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) that 
has taken place in Iraq since 2014. The term 
CRSV is used in the international discourse 
to designate sexual violence occurring 
during or following armed conflict. UN 
bodies have set a gravity threshold for 
defining CRSV—incidents or patterns of 
acts of sexual violence such as “rape, sexual 
slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, 
enforced sterilization, or any other form of 
sexual violence of comparable gravity” (UN 
Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict, 
2011, p. 3).1 
Factual overview of recent CRSV in Iraq
The armed conflict that spread across 
Iraq with the advent of ISIL increased 
the existing spiral of violence to an 
unprecedented level2 and sexual violence 
played a key role in ISIL’s reign of terror. 
The majority of those exposed to systematic 
1 WHO defined sexual violence as: “any sexual act, 
attempt to obtain a sexual act, unwanted sexual 
comments or advances, or acts to traffic, or oth-
erwise directed, against a person’s sexuality using 
coercion, by any person regardless of their rela-
tionship to the victim, in any setting, including 
but not limited to home and work” (Krug, 2002, 
p. 149). ICTR defined sexual violence as “any 
act of a sexual nature which is committed on a 
person under circumstances which are coercive” 
(ICTR, 1998, § 688). 
2 According to UNAMI, from the beginning of 
2014 until the end of July 2018, the number of 
civilian casualties of hostilities in Iraq amounted 
to 86,522 (30,605 killed and 55,917 injured) 
(UNAMI, 2018).
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sexual abuse were reportedly women and 
girls of the Yazidi faith, but also other 
religious and ethnic minorities. Sexual 
violence against men and boys of various 
religious and ethnic backgrounds has also 
been reported. The Iraqi Security Forces 
(ISF), and affiliated militias, are also said 
to have committed CRSV. In addition, 
there have been allegations that women 
with perceived affiliation to ISIL, residing 
in camps for internally displaced people 
(IDP), are being subjected to or threatened 
with rape and sexual exploitation (Amnesty 
International, 2018, pp. 27–29). 
Patterns of CRSV 
Sexual violence against Yazidi women was 
thoroughly documented and thus helps 
to illuminate the methods employed by 
ISIL. After ISIL established control over 
the Sinjar area, entire Yazidi families were 
taken captive (Human Rights Council, 
2016, para. 29). The separation of women 
and children from men and boys older 
than twelve followed (ibid, para. 42; 
UNAMI/OHCHR, 2016, para. 14). Men 
and boys were forced to choose between 
execution and conversion to Islam (ibid, 
2016, para. 32; UNAMI/OHCHR, 2014b, 
p. 12). Those who refused to convert were 
executed within hearing range of their 
families (ibid, 2016, para. 33-34; UNAMI/
OHCHR, 2016, para. 10; OHCHR, 2015, 
para. 18). Women were usually confronted 
with a similar choice: convert to Islam or 
be forced to continuously provide sexual 
services to ISIL fighters (ibid, 2015, p. 
22). However, even conversion would not 
spare them from being raped. Those who 
refused to convert or marry ISIL fighters 
were either sold or allotted to individual 
militants as ISIL’s “collective property” 
and forced to provide sexual services 
(UNAMI/OHCHR, 2014b, p. 13, 15).
Women were sold together with their 
small children (Human Rights Council, 
2016, para. 81). However, girls were 
separated from their mothers as soon as they 
turned nine and were subjected to the same 
pattern of abuse (ibid, para. 82). Boys above 
seven years of age were sent to ISIL camps 
to be indoctrinated and receive military 
training (ibid, para. 92, 94-95; OHCHR, 
2015, paras. 45-46).
From the survivors’ accounts it 
transpires that women were subjected to 
various forms of sexual violence including 
virginity tests (ibid 2016, para. 51), 
rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution 
(OHCHR, 2015, para. 35, 37), forced 
pregnancy (ibid, 2016, para. 71), and forced 
abortions (ibid, 2015, para. 39-41). They 
were coerced into sexual intercourse by 
being severely beaten, and threatened with 
gang rape, death, beating, and the killing 
or selling of their children (Human Rights 
Council, 2016, para. 65-68; UNAMI/
OHCHR, 2016, paras. 15-16). Multiple 
consistent allegations of the brutality of the 
sexual act—leading to bleeding, cuts, and 
bruises—have been recorded. For instance, 
some women were handcuffed behind their 
backs or had each leg tied to the side of the 
bed while being raped (ibid, 2016, para. 64) 
and escape attempts were severely punished 
by gang rape, as well as other atrocities 
(ibid, 2016, para. 68). Victims were denied 
medical care when injuries were incurred 
(ibid, 2016, para. 66) and there are 
accounts of women being raped hundreds 
of times during their captivity (ibid, 2016, 
para. 69). Even pregnant women were not 
spared (ibid, 2016, para. 64; UNAMI/
OHCHR, 2016, para. 14; OHCHR, 
2015, para. 41). Some were involuntarily 
administrated contraceptives (ibid, 2016, 
para. 69). The extent and outcome of the 
forced pregnancies and sexually transmitted 
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diseases that undoubtedly ensued were 
not satisfactorily documented due to 
victims’ reluctance to speak out (ibid, 
2016, para. 71). Sexual slavery was usually 
combined with forced labor in their captors’ 
households (ibid, 2016, para. 72). Food 
was sometimes deliberately withheld as a 
punishment; moreover, nutrition provided 
to the victims was generally poor (ibid, 
2016, para. 73). Some of the victims 
attempted or committed suicide (ibid, 2016, 
para. 53).
The following case examples aim 
at reporting the lived experiences of 
two individuals, whose experiences are 
representative of many other women.3 
Leila
When ISIL soldiers attacked their village in 
August 2014, Leila and her husband were 
taken as prisoners whereas their children, 
a son and three daughters, managed to 
escape. ISIL fighters forced Leila to watch 
her husband’s execution while forbidding 
her to express her grief by crying. She was 
then imprisoned and crammed between the 
dead bodies of former prisoners for hours. 
Afterwards, Leila was forced to convert to 
Islam and trafficked several times. Her initial 
resistance resulted in severe beatings and 
sexual abuse. She was initially sold to a man 
whose two wives frequently pressured her 
to kill herself. In spite of this, she refused 
to end her own life as her children would 
then be orphaned. Leila was eventually re-
3 These personal accounts, recorded in 2017, 
stem from narratives of two survivors who re-
ceived medical treatment and psychotherapeutic 
support at a Trauma Clinic for survivors of 
sexual violence in Iraq, run by the Jiyan Foun-
dation for Human Rights. The names have been 
changed for the purpose of protecting the survi-
vors’ identities.
sold to an elderly man whom she implored 
to treat her “as his daughter,” but to no 
avail. Again, she was sexually abused and 
then re-sold. Luckily, a random man on 
the street agreed to smuggle her to the 
Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) where she 
was reunited with her children. Upon her 
return, she learned that her oldest child had 
died of starvation, whereas the remaining 
children refused to accept her, and saw their 
paternal grandmother as their mother. Leila 
was shattered to the core. Her love for them 
had given her the strength to avoid taking 
her own life. She doubted that there could 
be justice in the world, as her tormentors 
were not punished. She reports a number 
of psychological symptoms following the 
captivity, including aggressive behavior, 
disrupted sleep, re-experiencing symptoms, 
hyper-arousal, and fear of men with long 
beards and loud voices. Leila perceives 
relocation out of Iraq, to somewhere the 
family could be safe and start afresh, as the 
only way out of this unbearable situation. 
Bahar
After a failed attempt to flee from her native 
village, Bahar, a seven-year-old Yazidi girl 
was captured by ISIL troops along with 
her mother, father and two siblings. ISIL 
separated the women and children from 
the men and imprisoned the former. Bahar 
had not seen her father since. Detention 
conditions were appalling. The prison cell 
was flooded with residue water, only inedible 
food and dirty drinking water were made 
available, and neither blankets nor heating 
were provided. Bahar’s mother stated, “ISIL 
militias have treated us very badly and brutally, 
furthermore, they have used offensive words. We 
have suffered due to hunger and thirst.” Women 
and girls considered attractive were separated 
from the rest of the group through brute 
force. “The atmosphere was full of the sounds of 
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women and children crying, screaming, praying 
and asking for help,” added the mother. 
Shortly thereafter, Bahar and the rest of the 
family were sold and forced to live with an 
ISIL militant and his family. In addition 
to being humiliated, beaten and exploited 
by the captor’s family, the girl’s mother 
was raped. She described the experience 
as “an unbelievably painful event I shall not 
forget for as long as I live,’’ and added, “I was 
only worried about my children.” The family 
was sold several times and Bahar’s mother 
was being continuously raped by different 
men. Finally, their last captor took pity on 
them and arranged their escape from ISIL 
controlled territory. The family now lives in 
an IDP camp in the KRI. Bahar still suffers 
from anxiety, cries a lot, displays fear towards 
a variety of external cues (e.g., loud voices, 
bearded men and people wearing black 
clothing), has nightmares, displays eating 
problems and cannot concentrate. 
Legal qualification of CRSV in Iraq 
International Human Rights Law
Given that nearly all international human 
rights treaties do not explicitly prohibit 
sexual violence, human rights bodies 
addressed it under provisions prohibiting 
torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment. Therefore, to assess 
whether CRSV committed in Iraq could 
be considered torture under International 
Human Rights Law (IHRL), one needs 
to determine whether the key elements of 
torture specified in article 1 of the United 
Nations Convention Against Torture 
(UNCAT) are met; namely, severity, intent 
and purpose, and state involvement. 
Severity: Regarding the criterion of severity, 
it is well established that any pain or 
suffering caused by rape meets the requisite 
level of severity (ICTY, 2004, § 485; Rodley 
& Pollard, 2009, p. 96). The pattern of 
sexual violence where women were deprived 
of liberty and incessantly raped is certainly 
severe. However, the situation is not so clear 
in the cases of other acts of sexual violence. 
Sexual harassment in the IDP camps, for 
instance, may not reach the level of severity 
required for torture.4 Although virginity tests 
might not always meet the torture threshold, 
in the present context, they were normally 
carried out as part of a larger abuse pattern. 
Therefore, most acts of sexual violence 
described by the survivors must have caused 
severe physical and/or psychological pain.
Intent and purpose: Severe pain and suffering 
must be inflicted intentionally and with 
a purpose in mind. It has been suggested 
that a purpose consistent with the logic of 
UNCAT should have “some-even remote-
connection with the interests of policies of the 
State and its organs” (Burgers & Danelius, 
1988, pp. 118–119). ISIL’s treatment 
of people not fitting into their vision of 
Islam reveals a purpose resembling those 
stipulated in the UNCAT. In the Yazidi case, 
this meant forced conversion to Islam, where 
Muslims of different beliefs and practices 
were expected to adopt the “correct” version 
of Islam. In any event, purposes explicitly 
specified as prohibited in the UNCAT—
such as punishing, intimidating or coercing 
the victim—are evident in the context 
described, and the experiences of Lila and 
Bahar. Therefore, we argue that the purpose 
element is also met. 
4 This does not, however, prevent adjudicating 
bodies from qualifying incidents with a sexual 
background as inhuman or degrading treatment. 
For a short overview of the practice of interna-
tional bodies in qualifying sexual violence as spe-
cific forms of ill-treatment see Gaggioli (Gaggioli, 
2014, p. 523).
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State involvement: Finally, it must be 
established whether the indicated pattern 
of CRSV in Iraq meets the requirement 
of state involvement set forth in article 
1 of the UNCAT. Some form of official 
sanction is required for a conduct to be 
designated as torture or other ill-treatment. 
In order to cover less conventional modes 
of state involvement, UNCAT specified 
that, in addition to a “public official,” a 
perpetrator can also be “any other person 
acting in an official capacity.” As this 
wording was meant to cover situations 
where state involvement was less evident, 
one could argue that even paramilitary 
formations wielding power resembling 
that of a state are covered. Namely, in 
the Elmi case,5 the Committee Against 
Torture (CAT) reasoned that in a state 
where a central government has collapsed, 
members of rival armed groups are to be 
considered persons acting in an official 
capacity (CAT, 1999, § 6.5). However, the 
same body later stated that where state 
authority exists, even nominally, violations 
committed by armed groups fall outside 
the ambit of the UNCAT.6
As ISIL never exercised authority in the 
absence of the de jure government in both 
5 CAT examined a complaint of a Somali national 
against Australia who claimed that, if returned 
to his country of origin, he would be tortured 
and killed by armed clans exercising a de facto 
control over Mogadishu. Australia argued that as 
armed clans cannot be considered public officials 
the definition of torture is not met and the ap-
plication ought to be declared inadmissible. See 
CAT (1999).
6 In H.M.H.I. v. Australia CAT dealt with an al-
most identical set of circumstances as in Elmi, 
only three years later. The crucial difference be-
ing that Somalia, at that point, did have a central 
government recognized by the international com-
munity (CAT, 2002, § 6.4).
Syria and Iraq, it seems that ISIL militants 
could be considered as neither state officials 
nor persons acting in an official capacity.
Similar problems arise if one qualifies 
CRSV as a violation of the right to life, 
or of the right to liberty and security 
of the person. The principal rule is that 
international law primarily deals with state 
responsibility for a breach of these specific 
obligations by an official whose acts are 
attributable to the state.7
It becomes more complicated when a 
state did not abide by its positive obligations. 
As the legal definition of slavery does not 
necessitate state involvement (Slavery 
Convention, 1927, Art. 1), private practices 
amounting to slavery can be qualified 
accordingly. The State could, then, be 
found responsible for the failure to meet its 
obligations (Stoyanova, 2017, p. 443-448) 
to act with due diligence in preventing such 
occurrences and punishing the perpetrators. 
The same is true for forms of ill-treatment 
other than torture and the violation of the 
right to life. However, these alternative 
avenues for qualifying and charging gross 
violations of human rights under IHRL 
might be seen as inappropriate for CRSV 
of such magnitude and brutality. Moreover, 
state-run justice systems could hardly 
effectively follow up on this by prosecuting 
individual perpetrators nationally.
Prospects for Holding ISIL Accountable as a 
Collective Entity
It is useful to consider whether an armed 
group member could be considered a 
person acting in an official capacity and, if 
so, whether it is possible to hold a state-like 
entity accountable. 
7 On attribution under IHRL see Marks and Azizi 
(2010).
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ISIL harbored an ambition to be perceived 
as a state and, more importantly, acted as 
one. It performed tasks falling within a state’s 
prerogatives (e.g., issuing official documents, 
including birth certificates, collecting taxes, 
etc.) (Callimachi, 2018). Executions, torture, 
and inhuman punishments were normally 
carried out following a ruling of self-appointed 
courts working to enforce ISIL rules. For 
instance, smoking and drinking were punished 
by lashing, and stealing by hand amputation 
(UNAMI/OHCHR, 2014c, p. 14).
However, the refusal of most of the 
international actors to consider sanctioning 
acts of privately run armed groups under 
the framework applicable to states persists, 
as if the group nature of the war effort is 
irrelevant for the capacity of individuals to 
commit mass crimes. In reality, however, such 
a state-like effort proves to be instrumental 
in enabling individuals to commit atrocities 
(e.g., war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
and genocide) on an immense scale. ISIL 
is a textbook example of such a paradigm, 
as its ability to indoctrinate, organize local 
administration, generate revenue and mobilize 
fighters from around the world surpassed that 
of many states. 
The international obligations of armed 
non-state actors and their accountability 
remains a largely academic debate. There 
are no international fora where state-like 
groups could be held responsible (Bellal, 
2017, pp. 240-242). Even if ISIL, as an 
armed non-state actor, is indeed, in addition 
to IHL, bound by IHRL, claims against it 
as a collective entity are not judicable at the 
international level.
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and 
International Criminal Law (ICL)
War crimes and crimes against humanity: In 
contrast to the IHRL, under the IHL/ICL 
framework, involvement of a state official is 
not necessary for an act to constitute torture 
(Henckaerts, Doswald-Beck, & Alvermann, 
2005, pp. 317–318). Namely, it is well 
established that the essence of torture, either 
as a war crime or a crime against humanity, 
is not in the status of the perpetrator but 
in “the nature of the act committed” (ICTY, 
2001a, § 495). It was further clarified that 
state involvement required under IHRL “is 
inconsistent with the application of individual 
criminal responsibility for international crimes 
found in international humanitarian law and 
international criminal law” (ICTY, 2001b, 
§§ 138–139).
Additionally, acts of CRSV are in and 
of themselves absolutely prohibited in 
international and non-international armed 
conflict under IHL (Henckaerts et al., 
2005, pp. 323–327) and thus can constitute 
international crimes in their own right. The 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (1998) explicitly criminalizes sexual 
slavery, enforced prostitution, forced 
pregnancy, enforced sterilization or any 
other form of sexual violence of comparable 
gravity (Art. 7 (1) (g), 8 (2)(b)(xxii), 8 
(2) (e) (vi)). Alternatively, CRSV could 
be characterized as other acts amounting 
to either war crimes (inhuman or cruel 
treatment) or crimes against humanity (e.g., 
persecution, enslavement or other inhuman 
acts) (Centre for International Law Research 
and Policy, 2017, pp. 21, 31, 42, 49, 57, 66). 
It follows that most of the outlined atrocities 
fit squarely within the above categories. 
Furthermore, specific requirements 
for an incident to be qualified either as 
a war crime (nexus between an offense 
and an armed conflict) or a crime against 
humanity (an act committed as a part of the 
widespread and systematic attack against 
civilians) are by and large met in the present 
situation. Namely, armed conflict in Iraq 
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could qualify as non-international as it 
meets the criteria of the intensity of violence 
and organizational capacity of the opposing 
parties (ICTY, 2008, § 49, 60). The acts 
themselves were by no means ordinary 
crimes given that the armed conflict “played 
a substantial part in the perpetrator’s ability to 
commit the crime, his or her decision to commit 
it, the manner in which it was committed, or the 
purpose for which it was committed” (ICTY, 
2008, § 49, 61). Lastly, ISIL’s entire modus 
operandi in committing CRSV satisfies the 
necessary requirements for an attack against 
civilians to be considered widespread and 
systematic; the “large scale nature of the 
attack and the number of victims” was noted, 
as well as “the organized nature of the acts of 
violence and the improbability of their random 
occurrence” (ICTY, 2001a, § 428-429). 
Genocide: Concerning the “crime of crimes,” 
as genocide is often known, it appears that 
the outlined pattern of CRSV committed 
against, at least, the Yazidi minority satisfies 
the material requirement for genocide. In 
particular, the prohibited acts of causing 
serious bodily or mental harm to members 
of the group and imposing measures 
intended to prevent births within the 
group. As to the mental element of the 
crime, namely the infamous genocidal 
intent (the intent to destroy, in whole or in 
part, a protected group), such an intent is 
discernible in documents issued by ISIL 
as well as consistent methodology, and a 
high level of organization and discipline 
demonstrated in carrying out the criminal 
acts. Moreover, the contours of a full-blown 
genocidal policy of ISIL towards Yazidis 
are discernible.8 Therefore, it appears 
8 The genocidal policy is, strictly speaking, not 
a requirement for a genocide to exist but can 
that CRSV perpetrated against Yazidis 
together with other prohibited acts through 
which destruction was to be effectuated 
(e.g., killing members of a group, forcibly 
transferring children, etc.) constituted acts 
of genocide as well.9 In sum, acts of CRSV, 
considered alone or categorized as torture 
or other crimes, may amount to war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, and genocide.
Severity requirement revisited: The question 
of severity also emerges in the context of 
IHL and ICL. Although severe forms of 
CRSV presumably constitute international 
crimes, this is not clear with regard to 
CRSV of lesser gravity. A certain threshold 
of gravity must be reached for an act 
of CRSV to be considered a war crime, 
crime against humanity or genocide. Acts 
of sexual violence of comparable gravity 
might include, for instance, “trafficking for 
sexual exploitation, mutilation of sexual organs, 
sexual exploitation (such as obtaining sexual 
services in return for food or protection), forced 
abortions, enforced contraception, sexual assault, 
forced marriage, sexual harassment (such as 
forced stripping), forced inspections for virginity 
and forced public nudity” (Gaggioli, 2014, 
pp. 506–507). 
As most of the CRSV reported from 
2014 onwards probably meets the required 
level of gravity, the gravity threshold 
cannot be considered a significant obstacle 
contribute to establishing that a perpetrator har-
bored a genuine genocidal intent (Gaeta, 2014, 
pp. 763–765).
9 For a comprehensive analysis of crimes com-
mitted against Yazidis and its characterization as 
genocide in line with the requirements set out in 
the Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide and the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, see 
Human Rights Council (2016). 
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for effective prosecution. Lastly, nothing 
prevents the forthcoming criminal justice 
mechanism in Iraq from extending its 
understanding of war crimes and/or crimes 
against humanity to cover all CRSV.10
Advantages of the IHL/ICL approach: In 
addition to the outlined advantage of making 
use of the framework provided by IHL and 
ICL rules, there are others. By qualifying 
CRSV as an atrocity crime due to its large-
scale and systematic nature, the so-called 
“contextual element” (Gaeta, 2014, pp. 756–
757) of these crimes and the common plan 
the perpetrators pursued to carry them out 
would come to light. It follows that concepts 
provided by IHL and ICL are important 
for ensuring that the “architects” of atrocity 
crimes are convicted, and are indispensable 
for establishing the broader narrative of how 
such crimes came to pass.
Overview of legal framework 
applicable in Iraq
International Level
Although Iraq is party to almost all core 
international human rights treaties,11 it 
10 The statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
stipulates that in addition to explicitly specified 
sexual crimes (rape, sexual slavery, enforced 
prostitution, forced pregnancy) any other forms 
of sexual violence are to be considered crimes 
against humanity (UN Security Council, 2002; 
Gaggioli, 2014, p. 507).
11 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(UNCAT); International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR); Convention for the 
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disap-
pearance (CED); Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW); International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion (CERD); International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR); 
did not accept any individual complaints 
procedure, nor did it ratify the Optional 
Protocol to the ICCPR abolishing the death 
penalty and the Optional Protocol to the 
UNCAT, which established an advanced 
system of monitoring places of detention. 
Moreover, it entered reservations to Articles 
2 (f, g) and 16 of the CEDAW mandating 
states to repeal discriminatory laws and 
practices and ensure equality in all matters 
related to family and marital relations.
Iraq is a state party to the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 and Additional 
Protocol I relating to the protection of 
victims of international armed conflicts, as 
well as to the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of Genocide. However, it 
neither acceded to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) nor 
accepted the ICC’s jurisdiction in relation 
to crimes committed on its territory under 
Art. 12 (3) of the Rome statute (UNAMI/
OHCHR, 2014a, pp. 4–7).
National Level
Iraqi legislation is inadequate for addressing 
grave human rights violations, particularly 
sexual violence because it does not possess 
a legal framework necessary for effective 
prosecution of perpetrators and redress of 
victims. Atrocity crimes are not criminalized 
under Iraqi law, whereas forms of criminal 
responsibility (joint criminal enterprise 
or command responsibility) necessary 
for linking planners of crimes and those 
with command authority to the actual 
commission of concrete crimes are not 
envisaged. Furthermore, Iraqi penal and 
criminal procedure laws display significant 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC); 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Dis-
abilities (CRPD).
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deficiencies. As rape is considered a private 
offense, the state cannot take legal action 
against the alleged perpetrator without the 
consent of a victim or their legal guardian 
(Iraqi Criminal Procedure Code, Article 3). 
Failure to prove rape could lead to the victim 
being prosecuted for extramarital sexual 
relations. Marital rape is not criminalized. 
Legal proceedings against an alleged rapist 
are to be discontinued if he marries his victim 
(Iraqi Criminal Code, Art. 398), a husband’s 
prerogative to punish his wife is considered 
his legal right rather than an offense (Iraqi 
Criminal Code, Art. 41), and honorable 
motives for committing an offense constitute 
mitigation ground (Iraqi Criminal Code, Art. 
128). Legal frameworks in KRI concerning 
discrimination of women have somewhat 
improved as some of the problematic 
provisions in the penal code have been 
repealed (article 41, 128) and several gender-
sensitive laws and strategies passed (KRG, 
2012; Puttick, 2015, pp. 6–10). However, 
given the enduring discrimination against 
women and KRI’s poor implementation 
record (Kaya, 2017, pp. 9-12), depicting 
KRI as progressive and the rest of Iraq as 
backward would be rather misleading. 
Finally, both the Government of 
Iraq (GOI) and the Kurdistan Regional 
Government (KRG) enacted controversial 
antiterrorism legislation with a broad 
definition of terrorism, inadequate legal 
safeguards, and mandatory death sentences 
for a range of offenses labelled as terrorist 
acts.12 Rape and other acts of sexual violence 
are not even criminalized under these laws 
(Human Rights Watch, 2017, p. 29).
12 For a critical assessment of KRG and FGI Anti-
Terrorism Laws No.3 of 2006 respectively see 
UNAMI/OHCHR (2017, pp. 7–8); UN Special 
Rapporteur (2018, §§ 46–49).
Ongoing efforts to punish perpetrators 
of grave human rights violations
Legal proceedings aimed at punishing ISIL 
supporters are taking place in both federal 
and KRI courts under their respective anti-
terrorism legislation. However, these trials 
have not been conducted in compliance 
with international fair trial standards. 
Alleged perpetrators are arbitrarily deprived 
of liberty and held “incommunicado” to 
facilitate the acquisition of confessions, 
often by force. Moreover, guilty verdicts 
rely on confessions only, as no other 
corroborating evidence is deemed 
necessary. In addition, merely being an 
ISIL member or affiliate, or assisting ISIL 
in any capacity, suffices for conviction 
and subsequent sentencing to death or 
life imprisonment (Human Rights Watch, 
2017). Finally, no efforts have been made 
to enable the participation of victims in the 
ongoing trials (Human Rights Watch, 2017, 
pp. 4, 22-23). 
The outlined milieu for administering 
justice has profoundly negative consequences 
for victims of sexual violence. It has been 
reported that even when the accused 
admitted to having perpetrated crimes of 
a sexual nature, no separate charge under 
this heading has been brought (Human 
Rights Watch, 2017, p. 30). In addition, the 
requirement that victims ought to bring the 
rape charges personally might deter many 
from coming forward. Put simply, the entire 
legal framework and practice of judicial 
bodies in tackling ISIL-generated sexual 
violence appears beyond repair.
When confronted with incriminating 
evidence indicating ISF involvement in 
torture or extrajudicial killings, GOI either 
rejected the allegations altogether or, on rare 
occasions, assured that investigation will be 
carried out. Not a single case where such 
crimes were adequately punished could be 
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verified (UN Special Rapporteur, 2018, 
§§ 57–58; UNAMI/OHCHR, 2017, p. 2).
As to the efforts to document serious 
crimes in Iraq in line with international 
standards, the most important actor is 
the Commission for Investigation and 
Gathering Evidence (CIGE). This body 
was established by the KRG in September 
2014 to document international crimes 
committed by ISIL. Although CIGE 
appears to have collected a large amount 
of evidence and even identified a number 
of perpetrators, further action is blocked 
due to an unfavorable domestic legal 
framework (UN Special Rapporteur, 
2018, § 71). 
An initiative to establish a full-blown 
criminal tribunal in KRI, mandated to 
prosecute and try perpetrators of grave 
crimes committed in the war with ISIL 
in line with best international practices, 
has most probably been abandoned (Van 
Schaack, 2018, p. 125). This is a further 
discouragement to the possibility of justice. 
Assistance of the International Community
Following the request for assistance from the 
Iraqi Government, the UN Security Council 
established a special body (Investigative 
Team to Support Domestic Efforts to Hold 
ISIL (Da’esh) Accountable for Acts that 
May Amount to War Crimes, Crimes Against 
Humanity and Genocide Committed in Iraq 
(IT)) in September 2017 to assist GOI in 
holding ISIL accountable for international 
crimes committed on its territory. The core 
mandate of the IT is to collect and store 
evidence against ISIL, for acts amounting to 
atrocity crimes, to be used in fair criminal 
proceedings, primarily before Iraqi courts 
(UN Security Council, 2017 § 2, 5).
The Special Advisor is mandated to 
“work with survivors… to ensure that their 
interests in achieving accountability for 
ISIL are fully recognized” (UN Security 
Council, 2017 § 13). After the terms of 
reference were finalized in February 2017 
(UN Security Council, 2018), the UN 
Secretary-General was appointed as the 
head of the IT on 31 May 2018.13 At the 
point of writing this article, it is not clear 
whether the IT became fully operational 
on the ground. 
The IT faces considerable challenges.14 
It cannot ignore crimes committed by non-
ISIL armed groups and also be perceived 
as impartial by all religious/ethnic groups 
in Iraq, empower the same courts that 
are sentencing alleged ISIL supporters in 
flagrant disregard of human rights standards, 
or cooperate closely with the KRG bodies 
such as CIGE, while respecting Iraq’s claim 
on absolute sovereignty. Persuading Iraq to 
properly address atrocities committed within 
its borders, in exchange for focusing on 
ISIL crimes only, may prove to be a mistake. 
In particular, the fates of those already 
convicted under anti-terrorism laws have not 
been duly considered. 
Forthcoming court—basic requirements
Although the structure and composition 
of the prospective court are not known, 
it would need to meet some minimum 
requirements. Any criminal justice 
accountability mechanism established to 
deal with serious violations of international 
law, including CRSV in Iraq, in addition 
to having jurisdiction over international 
crimes committed by all parties to the 
13 A UK citizen with extensive experience in ICL 
and IHRL, Mr. Karim Asad Ahmad Khan, has 
been appointed to serve as a head of ITA in the 
capacity of a Special Advisor (UN Secretary-
General, 2018).
14 For a detailed analysis of the ITA and its pros-
pects of success, see van Schaack (2018).
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conflict, would need to be embedded in 
a wider transitional justice strategy of the 
GOI and KRG. Besides addressing criminal 
accountability, truth-seeking, and reparation 
issues, such a strategy should include a 
plan for dealing with individuals convicted 
in deficient proceedings conducted under 
anti-terrorism legislation. Legal professionals 
working in the forthcoming court or tribunal 
ought to be capable of managing diverse 
evidence and making it available to the 
defence. These professionals should be able 
to correctly qualify the crimes in question 
and be well versed in different modes of 
liability, such as co-perpetration, indirect 
perpetration, joint criminal enterprise, 
and objective liability, in order to connect 
senior leaders and those higher up in the 
chain of command with individual crimes. 
Merely proving that crimes actually took 
place does not suffice. They need to be 
attributed to individual perpetrators by 
utilizing the “beyond reasonable doubt” 
standard of proof typically applied in 
criminal justice settings (Wilkinson, 
2011, pp. 17–18). Standards employed 
by various UN fact-finding missions 
established to collect evidence, including 
the Commission of Inquiry on Syria, fall 
short of the requisite standard of evidence 
(UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria, 
2018, § 4; Wilkinson, 2011, pp. 40–41). 
Ideally, various data collection and analysis 
methods need to be employed to produce 
evidence on patterns of sexual violence 
(Aranburu, 2010). Finally, victims need to 
be adequately involved in the forthcoming 
trials. This would involve establishing a 
victim and witness support department and 
arrangements for their protection. 
The issue of reparations 
Reparations for victims of CRSV including 
rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees 
of non-repetition are particularly sensitive.15 
The most suitable response to these 
crimes would be pursuing a transformative 
approach to reparations (UN Secretary-
General, 2014, pp. 8–9), giving preference to 
measures capable of changing the imbalance 
of power that is detrimental for women 
in present-day Iraq. Guarantees of non-
repetition are also important considering 
that many Iraqis have lost confidence in the 
state to prevent the recurrence of atrocities. 
Survivors belonging to the Yazidi community 
actively seek any opportunity to emigrate. 
Indeed, there have recently been initiatives, 
such as those sponsored by the German 
Federal State of Baden-Württemberg, 
offering Yazidi women temporary re-
settlement and mental health treatment in 
third states. However, relocating survivors 
from their homeland, in the long term, 
may have a detrimental effect on the local 
society as it erodes north Iraq’s cultural 
and ethnic diversity. This highlights the 
need for the State to work on appropriate 
legal, economic, physical and psychological 
recovery measures as soon as possible after 
violent conflict has ended.
Law No. 20 on Compensation for 
Victims of Military Operations, Military 
Mistakes and Terrorist Actions, passed by 
the Iraqi parliament in 2009, provides a 
framework for victims of recent atrocities 
to claim material compensation in the 
form of a one-time payment (the award of 
family rent or a plot of land). However, the 
amounts given to victims are relatively small; 
this statute has a number of shortcomings 
and is not fully implemented in practice.16 
15 On the right to reparation in general see (UN 
General Assembly, 2006).
16 For a detailed analysis of the forms of reparation 
envisaged by the law, and practice of state organs 
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Most recently, on 28 March 2019, the 
Iraqi Presidency submitted a Yazidi Female 
Survivors´ Law17 to Parliament suggesting 
a range of reparative measures for Yazidi 
women abducted by ISIL and then released 
(Press release of the Iraqi Presidency, 2019). 
Although some articles, such as those 
recognizing genocide against Yazidis (though 
it refers only to abducted women) (Yazidi 
Female Survivors´ Law, Article 9), ensuring 
monthly payments as a way of compensation 
(Yazidi Female Survivors´ Law, Article 8), 
establishing a national remembrance day 
on crimes committed against the Yazidis 
(Yazidi Female Survivors´ Law, Article 10), 
and pledging rehabilitation services (Yazidi 
Female Survivors´ Law, Article 5), are to be 
condemned. The bill left much to be desired. 
Namely, it contains no explicit reference to 
CRSV and excludes all victims other than 
abducted and subsequently released Yazidi 
women. This bill thus hardly advances the 
objectives of transitional justice in Iraq as it 
tends to fuel rather than overcome sectarian 
divisions in Iraqi society, especially among 
victims themselves.
Acknowledging the victim’s perspective
The victims of CRSV face multiple traumas 
and require appropriate responses that 
involve them in decision-making processes. 
On the one hand, this requires making 
survivors aware of the legal status of the 
atrocities that have befallen them with 
a view to enabling them to accept the 
justice dispensed by the state, and thus 
facilitating the healing process. On the 
authorized to work on its implementation see 
Sandoval and Puttick (2017, pp. 17–21).
17 At this point it is hard to foresee whether this law 
will be passed through the Iraqi parliament and 
whether there is a room for improvement. 
other hand, lawyers, politicians, and other 
decision-makers must keep individual 
fates in mind when drafting legislation, 
ratifying international instruments, and 
creating accountability mechanisms or 
reparation programmes aimed at redress. 
Whilst there is no general consensus on 
the appropriate mode of participation for 
victims in criminal proceedings, punishing 
the perpetrators appears essential for 
strengthening their healing process (Danieli, 
2009, p. 45). Keeping victims removed 
from legal reckoning and focusing solely 
on “eliminating the problem” produces 
especially grave effects as it denies survivors 
a crucial chance to regain power against the 
perpetrators as part of their mental healing 
and search for justice.
Our position
Mass CRSV reached international awareness 
both in the early 1990s during the war in 
the former Yugoslavia, and in 2014 as the 
conflict in Iraq and Syria raged. Although 
both provoked a public outcry, they led 
to different outcomes. Whereas the UN 
Security Council in the 1990s established 
the ICTY, today we can witness a range of 
indecisive actions aimed at assisting Iraq 
in holding ISIL members accountable. 
These actions are not entirely misplaced; 
however, the question to be raised is whether 
they are sufficient. The main assumption 
on which IHRL rests, namely that gross 
human rights violations committed by non-
state actors are to be sanctioned nationally, 
simply does not hold in the case of Iraq. The 
outlined accounts demonstrate that Iraqi 
authorities have no capacity either to bring 
justice to victims or to set the groundwork 
for enduring peace. The international 
avenues are also blocked since survivors 
have no recourse to international instances 
dealing with either state or individual 
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criminal responsibility. The situation is 
also complicated by the fact that most 
crimes have been committed by members 
of non-state armed actors. In light of this, 
the efforts of the international community 
focusing solely on enhancing the capacity of 
GOI seem inappropriate. 
The psychological scars caused by the 
loss of family members to violent conflict, 
long periods of captivity and extended 
physical and psychological abuse, if not 
appropriately addressed, give rise to 
significant impairments to the individuals, 
their families, and communities and society 
as a whole. Yet, the two personal accounts 
presented in this paper bear witness to 
the extraordinary strength, resilience, and 
vitality of the survivors who managed to 
endure against the odds. This must be 
acknowledged. In addition to appropriate 
legal processing, the medical, psychological 
and social recovery of survivors must be 
accorded due priority in all programmes 
addressing CRSV in Iraq.
From a transitional justice perspective, 
the most sensible way to proceed would 
be to refer cases to the ICC or establish 
a hybrid tribunal mandated to prosecute 
and adjudicate serious international crimes 
committed by all parties in the conflict in 
Iraq, and to pursue a comprehensive gender-
sensitive reparation programme. Iraq’s 
compliance could be induced by, for instance, 
making the development and reconstruction 
assistance conditional upon meeting basic 
transitional justice requirements. The people 
of Iraq simply deserve better justice than that 
currently dispensed.
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